Hamburger Hill Essay

The entire mountain is a rugged, uninviting wild blanketed in double- and triple-canopy jungle, dense thickets of bamboo, and waist-high elephant grass. Local Montagnard tribesmen called Ap Bia the mountain of the crouching beast. LTC Weldon Honeycutt, commander of the 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry (the Rakkasans), called it cumulus 937. The Soldiers who fought there dubbed it Hamburger Hill. The ? ght on Hamburger Hill occurred during Operation Apache Snow, the second part of a three-phased campaign intended to repeal North Vietnam Army (NVA) bases in the treacherous A Shau Valley.The American and southeast Vietnamese units participating in Apache Snow knew, based on lively intuition and previous experiences in the A Shau, that they were in for a bad ? ght. Beyond that, however, they had little evidence as to the opposites material strength and dispositions. Masters of camou? age, the NVA completely concealed their bases from aerial surveillance. When the NVA moved, they d id so at shadow along trails covered by triple-canopy jungle, again con makeing utterance from above.They effected their command and control mainly by runner and wire, go forth no electronic signature for the Americans to monitor or trace. Technology, therefore, provided scant financial aid to the American battalion commander trying to see the enemy during Apache Snow. He had to generate his own tacticalintelligence. Patrols, captured equipment, installations, documents, and occasionally prisoners provided combat commanders with the raw data from which to scoop out their assessment of the enemy order of battle and dispositions. Gathering this information took time, though.Moreover, intelligence about the enemys strength and dispositions did not necessarily shed light on his commanders intent. It took years to ascertain this, and the learning experience turn up decidedly unpleasant for the Americans. On 11 May, Honeycutt dispersed his Rakkasans and scoured the vicinity to th e north and northwest of Ap Bia Mountain. When Bravo Company made heavy contact lens with some NVA late in the day, Honeycutt adjusted his estimate of the enemys strength from a few trail watchers to a reinforced platoon or even a company.The Rakkasans could still deal with a force that size, scarcely they would have to concentrate to do so. For the next three days, Honeycutt fought the mountain and the NVA to make his scattered companies together for a coordinated battalion attack. Despite the occurrence that, since the initial assault, no company was more than about 1, viosterol meters from the crest of the mountain, it took twain days to consolidate the battalion for a three-company assault.Time and again, the American infantrymen found themselves hampered as much by the topography as by the enemy. The rugged terrain slowed dismounted heading to a crawl. Between 12 and 14 May, for example, Delta Company was virtually immobilized when it went down pat(p) a steep ravine and was caught there by the enemy. In one weighty ? ve-hour extent, the company labored to advance a total of only 500 meters. The steep, mud-covered slopes, more than the enemy, kept this company from ful? lling Honeycutts intent.In the end, the troops had to throw overboard their attack and withdraw the way they had come. These three days were a period of intensely unpleasant discovery learning for Honeycutt and his men. Map reconnaissance and chop over-? ights did not indicate that his initial scheme of maneuver was impractical. It took Delta Companys three-day ordeal to do so. Though Honeycutt had a long and distinguished testify as a combat commander in both Vietnam and Korea, he underestimated Ap Bia Mountain and the NVA facing him.Although his estimate of the enemy strength was incorrect, his miscalculation was not immediately apparent to him or to any of the American leadership. It took three days of assaults by Bravo and Charlie Companies, each bloodily repulsed, before th e situation became clearer. The enemy was stronger than anticipated, much stronger than company strength, and he grew more powerful every night as he received reinforcements from Laos. The NVA commanders demonstrated continuity and willingness to replace heavy losses indicated he intended to put up a stiff ? ght for Hill 937 (Scalard).